Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars by Redding, Paul
Finally, Kierkegaard’s use of the term “aesthetic” has caused Kosch some
unnecessary concern (142). It was wasted labor, for Kierkegaard expanded an
ordinary adjective into a major concept for existential analysis. Post Kierke-
gaard, the word can never be the same, although the basic notion of feeling
and experiential involvement will still be present. Kierkegaard considerably
thickened the concept by expanding it to include a certain form of life that
may depreciate reflection or even debauch it by showing how reflection can also
be used as a tool for the control and destruction of other human beings through,
for instance, a maniacal manipulation and seduction. What he does with the
term is philologically responsible, and respect for the growth and history of
concepts even finds it exciting.
Professor Kosch’s well-ordered and detailed exposition is stimulating
and provocative.
Robert L. Perkins
Stetson University
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Among readers enthused by John McDowell’s justifiably widely discussed Mind
and World (1994) were those who combined interests in Kant and German
idealism with an unwillingness to accept the idea of an unbridgeable gap sep-
arating these topics from contemporary analytic philosophy. Starting with Wil-
frid Sellars’s well-known critique of epistemologically foundationalist forms of
empiricism (the “Myth of the Given”), McDowell had initially focused upon the
Kantian dimension of Sellars’s critique. For perceptual experience to be epis-
temologically relevant, it must be conceptually articulated because only some-
thing with conceptual content can stand in appropriately rational relations to
empirical claims. But McDowell was equally concerned to avoid the familiar
“coherentist” (and relativism-threatening) alternatives, a position identified
there with Donald Davidson. McDowell thus lamented this “seesawing” between
appeals to, and critiques of, regress-stopping “Givens” characterizing modern
analytic epistemology. But while this story would have been familiar to analytic
I am most grateful to Melissa Merritt and David Macarthur for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this review.
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philosophers, many surely would have been puzzled by McDowell’s suggestion
as to its solution. If we want to “dismount the seesaw,” we should think through
Kant’s idea of the “conceptual shaping” of experience all the way to its Hegelian
conclusion.
In the fourteen essays making up the excellent collection under review,
McDowell continues to work at the various interfaces set up in Mind and World —
first, that between a post-Sellarsian approach to analytic philosophy and the
reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and next, that concerning
the vexed question of the relation of the respective “idealisms” of Kant and
Hegel. The essays range roughly over a decade, starting (textually, and seem-
ingly, chronologically) with McDowell’s three “Woodbridge Lectures” delivered
at Columbia University in 1997 and first published in Journal of Philosophy in
1998. These three essays are grouped under the section heading “Sellars, Kant,
and Intentionality,” and the headings of the other three sections—”Kantian
Themes in Hegel and Sellars,” “Reading Hegel,” and “Sellarsian Themes”—
convey something of the way these essays interrelate and develop McDowell’s
thought beyond Mind and World . Combined, they provide a context within
which McDowell’s subtle and complex approach to philosophy can itself
“come into view.” Given the period over which they were written, it is understan-
dable that there are some changes and adjustments as McDowell responds to
objections, tries out new tacks, and revises and develops interpretations of pas-
sages from the difficult writings of Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.
In Mind and World , Sellars’s philosophy had really been represented by
only a few central ideas from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1997), first
published in 1956—the critique of the “Myth of the Given,” the approach to
the content of perceptual states on the model of their linguistic expressions,
and the pragmatic idea of assertions as the placing of declarative sentences
within the public and normatively structured “space of reasons.” Here, starting
with the opening three essays, Sellars is given a much more substantive presence.
McDowell regards the direction taken by Sellars in Empiricism and the Philosophy
of Mind (1997) as not merely relevant to epistemology but more broadly as an
attempt to solve the puzzle of the intentionality of mental states. And as McDo-
well makes explicit in the first of these essays, what he sees himself sharing with
Sellars is the belief that “there is no better way for us to approach an under-
standing of intentionality than by working towards understanding Kant” (3).
In these three essays, the focus is therefore primarily directed to Sellars’s more
explicitly Kantian text, Science and Metaphysics (2002), from 1967.
While McDowell’s way into understanding Kant is via Sellars’s approach,
he is nevertheless critical of the details of Sellars’s own interpretation. (In the
context of McDowell’s reading of Hegel in section 3, there is a hint of the same
attitude toward Robert Pippin, who has pursued a “post-Kantian” interpreta-
tion of Hegel. That is, McDowell seems simultaneously inspired by Pippin’s
approach and critical of Pippin himself for being insufficiently true to his
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own interpretation.) McDowell sees Sellars’s interpretation of Kant as needlessly
fighting against the pull of Hegel and seemingly feels that he can take Kant in
the direction of Hegel in a Sellarsian spirit for a number of interconnected
reasons. Sellars himself misunderstands the nature of the philosophical commit-
ment awaiting at the Hegelian terminus (McDowell’s Hegel, like Pippin’s, is not
the metaphysical bogeyman traditional to the analytic tradition). Sellars’s own
attempt to avoid the Hegelian path takes him (“Sellars of all people,” 40) back
into the grip of the “Myth of the Given.” And, finally, the scientistic coloring of
Sellars’s Kant sits poorly with Kant’s fundamental thought.
As in Mind and World , McDowell here insists that not only is perceptual
content conceptual but that it is entirely so, raising the question (for example, in
Hanna, 2005) of what has happened to Kant’s “intuitions”—the nonconceptual
representations that supposedly combine with concepts in perception. It is thus
that we find throughout the essays (in section 2 especially) McDowell’s attempts
to find in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (its rewritten second edition, in particu-
lar) evidence against the textbook distinction between concepts and intuitions.
Historically, McDowell finds the elements of this reading of Kant in Hegel, and,
more recently, in Sellars, who interpreted intuitions as belonging to a subclass
of concepts. But while for Sellars this testified to the ambiguity of Kant’s notion of
intuition—sometimes meaning a type of demonstrative concept, a “this such,”
and sometimes something nonconceptual and more like the empiricist’s sen-
sation or sensory impression—McDowell dismisses both the claimed ambiguity
(an idea “foisted on Kant by Sellars,” 24) and the limited conceptuality of the
“this-such.” In contrast, McDowell insists that intuition is “judgment-shaped”
and not “a fragment of judgmental content” (35). Sellars had originally devel-
oped the intuition-as-sensation idea so as to conceive of the application of
empirical concepts in perceptual judgments as somehow “guided” by something
nonconceptual; but according to McDowell, this sins not only against Kant’s text
but also against Sellars’s own critique of the Myth of the Given.
McDowell’s criticism of Sellars here takes him into the territory of recent
debates within the philosophy of perception that will be familiar to readers of
Mind and World . For example, McDowell’s insistence, contra Sellars, that per-
ceptual content is propositional has given rise to the objection that he has an
implausibly “quasi-linguistic” idea of perceptual experience (135). McDowell’s
various defenses of his idea, which unfold mainly through the essays in section 2,
are ingenious; however, just as Kantians may worry over the fate of intuitions,
Hegelians may wonder if this approach to perceptual content is the right way
to understand Hegel. (Indeed, there are many aspects of McDowell’s inter-
pretations of Kant and Hegel that will provoke more conventional readers of
these philosophers.) McDowell’s defense of the propositionality claim is pur-
sued with such vigor that it comes as a surprise when, in the final essay, he seems,
apparently on the urgings of Charles Travis, to give it up without much of a
fight. One might wonder just where this leaves McDowell and wonder why
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Sellars’s “this such” alternative, although hinted at, does not explicitly come
back into consideration.
Regardless of whether one agrees with his various claims and inter-
pretations, it is a joy to follow McDowell’s illuminating and thought-provoking
journey through this philosophical terrain.
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The core notion of Godfrey Smith’s account is that of a “Darwinian population,”
which is “a population—a collection of particular things—that has the capacity
to undergo evolution by natural selection” (6). A “Darwinian individual” is a
member of such an evolving population. This sounds very broad, but the aim is
a general characterization of the features that an ensemble of objects must have
to be able to undergo selection-guided change. Indeed, Darwinian populations
exist on different levels of organization. While some Darwinian populations are
made up of organisms, others are collections of genes, cells, or organism groups.
In addition to a general construal of evolving things, Godfrey-Smith
devotes substantial attention to marginal cases. There is not really an essence
of Darwinian-population-hood. Rather, there are paradigmatic cases that clearly
exhibit change by natural selection but also borderline instances. To capture
this conceptually, Godfrey-Smith considers five quantitative properties with re-
spect to which Darwinian populations can differ. The three most important ones
are the heritability H (the degree of parent-offspring similarity), the continuity
and smoothness of the fitness landscape C (to which extent a small change in an
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